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Abstract
This paper examines Plutarch’s exploitation of Plato’s Symposium in chs. 4-7 of the Life of 
Alcibiades. It aims to demonstrate that the Symposium is much more than a “source” for the 
Alcibiades. Rather the Alcibiades invites an intertextual reading with the Symposium, and 
becomes more meaningful when read with the Symposium in mind. In particular, knowledge of 
the Symposium reveals how Plutarch has constructed Socrates’ attitude to and relationship with 
Alcibiades as that of the ideal lover with his beloved.
Plato’s Symposium offers perhaps the most vivid, and certainly the most 
influential, picture of Alcibiades to survive from classical antiquity. It is no 
surprise, then, that Plutarch should in his Life of Alcibiades draw heavily on 
it, as well as on other Platonic texts such as the First Alcibiades and Republic 
Book 61. A full analysis would attempt to trace Plutarch’s use in this Life 
of all the Platonic texts; indeed it is the way the Alcibiades uses allusions to 
multiple Platonic texts, together with material drawn from non-Platonic 
sources, especially Thucydides and the rhetorical tradition, that makes it so 
rewarding and so complex. But the aims of this paper are more limited. I 
shall focus solely on the Symposium and shall attempt to show not only the 
depth of Plutarch’s engagement with that text, especially in chs. 4-7, but also 
how the Alcibiades becomes richer and more meaningful if it is read with the 
Symposium in mind2.
The importance of Alcibiades’ relationship with Socrates and of the 
Platonic texts is made clear right at the start of the Life, where, after dealing 
briefly with Alcibiades’ family, Plutarch makes the surprising claim that 
Alcibiades’ fame was owed “in no small part” to Socrates’ kindness to him; a 
little later he cites Plato as a source for the name of Alcibiades’ tutor (1.3)3. 
In ch. 3 Plutarch mentions a scandalous story of Alcibiades’ running away 
from Pericles’ house to one of his lovers (3.1); the kind of precocious sexual 
behaviour exhibited there might suggest to readers the story of Alcibiades’ 
failed seduction of Socrates in Smp. 218b-219d4. At any rate it provides a nice 
1 There are allusions to numerous other Platonic texts in the Alcibiades, including the 
Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Apology. Important discussions are in D. A. Russell, 1966, pp. 39-41 
(= repr. 1995, pp. 195-8); C. B. R. Pelling, 1996, pp. xlvii-xlix; 2005, pp. 116-25; D. Gribble, 
1999, pp. 270-6; T. E. Duff, 1999, pp. 224-7; and, on the use made of both Plato and other 
Socratic writers, F. Alesse, 2005.
2 Cf. C. B. R. Pelling, 2005, p. 125: “In Alcibiades, then, pervasive intertextuality with Plato 
lends depth and resonance to the sort of associations which we saw in Plutarch’s other works, 
and draws the reader into tracing how rich is the possibility of learning from Socrates’ example 
– and also how difficult it can be”. Cf. also C. B. R. Pelling, 2008, p. 548. 
3 The reference is to Alc. 1, 122b.
4 Alcibiades’ reference to Marsyas, the inventor of the flute, in 2.6 may recall his comparison 
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link to the theme of the rivalry between Socrates and Alcibiades’ other lovers, 
who compete for influence over him, which fills chs. 4-7 of the Life. 
Plutarch begins by noting the strong contrast between the motivations of 
the two groups: they are “awestruck” (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) at his beauty5, whereas 
Socrates does not stop merely at such external attributes; indeed Socrates’ love 
is evidence of Alcibiades’ “potential for virtue” (τῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐας), 
which he could see “hinted at in his appearance and shining through”. This 
contrast, between those interested in a beautiful boy for his looks alone and 
those interested in fostering his moral development, is central in Platonic and 
post-Platonic discussions of love, and exemplified in Socrates’ behaviour to 
Alcibiades in the First Alcibiades, which is clearly in mind here6.
Plutarch now describes, in a passage heavily influenced by Republic 6, how 
Socrates tried to protect Alcibiades from the corrupting flatteries of his other 
lovers (4.1)7. Plutarch continues, giving Socrates motivation: “For” [sc. Socrates 
thought] fortune never so surrounded or fenced anyone off with so-called good 
things8 that he becomes invulnerable to philosophy and unreachable by words 
which have boldness and bite” (ὥστ’ ἄτρωτον ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας γενέσθαι καὶ
λόγοις ἀπρόσιτον παρρησίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἔχουσιν)9. The metaphor of biting 
to describe the effect of outspoken criticism, is known from elsewhere in 
Plutarch10. Its use here might make one think of the story of Alcibiades’ literal 
biting of his opponent in a wrestling match in 2.2-3; this time it is he that is 
bitten, by philosophy. But it also draws on Alcibiades’ claim in Smp. 217e-218a, 
of Socrates to Marsyas in Smp. 215a-216c. The story of Alcibiades’ killing one of his attendants 
(ἀκολουθούντων mss) or servants (ἀκολούθων Cobet) at a wrestling ground (3.1) might also 
bring to mind Alcibiades’ wrestling with Socrates before his attempted seduction, as well as the 
attendant who used to accompany him on his meetings with Socrates (217a) and the ἀκόλουθοι 
mentioned at his entrance to the party (212c-d); cf. also the ἀκόλουθοι in Th. 6.28 who inform 
on Alcibiades’ profanation of the Mysteries.
5 This recalls Alcibiades’ words in Smp. 215d, where he declares that he and everyone else 
are awestruck (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) by Socrates’ words; the interests of Alcibiades’ lovers are in a 
less high-minded direction. There may also here be an allusion to the reaction of Charmides’ 
admirers to his physical beauty (Charm. 154c), suggesting a parallel between Alcibiades and 
Charmides.
6 For Socrates as interested in improving Alcibiades’ soul rather than merely possessing his 
body, see e.g. Alc. 1 131e; Aeschines, Alc. fr. VI A 53.26-27 Giannantoni = 11 Ditmar; cf. Plato, 
Prt. 309c. Xenophon states this as a general principle of Socrates in Xen., Mem. 4.1.2 and has 
Socrates himself argue that love of the soul is more noble than love of the body in Xen., Smp. 
8.1-41.
7 See Rep. 491d-492a and 493e-5b: see below, nn. 9, 30, 35, 44, and C. B. R. Pelling, 1996, 
p. xlviii; 2005, pp. 120-1; T. E. Duff, 1999, pp. 224-7; D. Gribble, 1999, pp. 219-20, 272-3.
8 Τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς: an allusion to Rep. 6: the philosophical nature is corrupted and 
diverted from philosophy by τὰ λεγόμεθα ἀγαθά, defined first as “beauty, wealth, strength of 
body, influential family connections in the city and all such things” (491c) and later as “wealth 
and all such paraphernalia” (495a).
9 Possibly also an allusion to Smp. 219e, where Alcibiades notes that Socrates was 
invulnerable (ἄτρωτος) to money; Socrates knows that no-one is invulnerable to the superior 
power of philosophy.
10 “Biting” παρρησία: De aud. 47a; De adul. 55c-d; 59d; 68f-69a; Phoc. 2.3; Per. 15.1 (with P. 
A. Stadter, 1989, ad loc.); Praec. ger. 810c; fr. 203 Sandbach.
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that the effect of Socrates’ words on him was worse than a snake-bite: only one 
who has been bitten by a snake can imagine the pain. “I have been bitten by 
a more painful creature and in the most painful way one could be bitten - in 
my heart or soul or whatever one should call it, wounded and bitten by the 
words of philosophy” (πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων). 
Such words, he declares, “adhere more fiercely than a viper, whenever they grip 
the soul of a young and not untalented (μὴ ἀφυοῦς) man”. Plato’s Alcibiades 
goes on to appeal to his fellow-symposiasts, naming six of them, who had 
all experienced what he calls “philosophic madness and frenzy”. Memory of 
that passage underlines how painful Alcibiades’ experience of being exposed 
to Socrates’ philosophic probing was. It also explains and lends more force to 
Plutarch’s Socrates’ belief that no-one is invulnerable to philosophy.
Plutarch now talks, in a passage enriched by further allusions to the 
Republic, of the efforts of Alcibiades’ flatterers to prevent him from listening 
to Socrates, though in fact, despite this, Alcibiades did let Socrates approach 
him (4.2). Alcibiades, Plutarch continues, “listened to the words of a lover 
who was not hunting unmanly pleasure (ἡδονὴν ἄνανδρον) nor begging for 
kisses and touches . . .” (4.3). The insistence that Socrates was not interested 
in Alcibiades’ body is probably meant to bring to mind Socrates’ rebuffing of 
Alcibiades’ sexual advances in the Symposium. The phrase “unmanly pleasure” 
recalls Alcibiades’ wonder, after his rejection, at Socrates’ “nature, self-control 
and manliness (ἀνδρείαν)” (Smp. 219d). It invokes a set of ideas, common in 
ancient thought, which associated love of pleasure with the feminine. Plutarch’s 
words are perhaps not to be taken as implying a criticism of pederasty per se; 
rather the point here is about the goal for which a relationship with a boy is 
pursued: the courting of a free-born boy for sexual gratification alone, without 
any educational or moral intent, was in the Classical period, as in Plutarch’s 
own, seen as unacceptable and had in fact been condemned in no uncertain 
terms by Pausanias in his speech in the Symposium (183d-185b). Socrates, 
then, was not interested in Alcibiades merely for physical pleasure; instead he 
wanted to improve Alcibiades morally. The claim that Socrates was not seeking 
“unmanly pleasure” is also a point about the effects of Socrates’ love on Alcibiades. 
Socrates’ love was not one that “unmanned” him, through encouraging soft-
living, love of pleasure and luxury – the kind of things that his other lovers 
offered (cf. 6.1, πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑποβάλλουσιν). Rather, it toughened and 
hardened him. Plutarch will return to the hardening effect of Socrates’ love in 
ch. 6, where he compares Socrates’ treatment of Alcibiades, when he returns 
from his other lovers, to thrusting iron which has been softened by heat into 
cold water. He will also demonstrate in ch. 7, when he deals with Socrates 
and Alcibiades’ service together on campaign, that Socrates’ love really did 
encourage Alcibiades to be a man, to fight bravely in the battle-line and not 
shirk from danger11.
11 The notion that a lover might want to keep his beloved from being a man — a reversal 
of the usual justifications of pederasty for its educational benefits — is set out in Socrates’ one-
sided attack on love in his speech in Phaedrus 238e-241d: a lover will want to make his beloved 
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Plutarch is here, then, making explicit what emerges implicitly from 
Alcibiades’ narrative in the Symposium: that Socrates’ love, unlike that of his 
other suitors, neither sought pleasure as its goal nor unmanned its object. 
Instead, Plutarch continues, Socrates was a lover, “ . . . who tried to expose the 
cracked elements of Alcibiades’ soul and squeeze his empty and foolish pride” 
(ἐλέγχοντος τὰ σαθρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ πιεζοῦντος τὸν κενὸν καὶ ἀνόητον 
τῦφον). This is loosely based on Smp. 215c-216a, where Alcibiades speaks of the 
powerful effects of Socrates’ λόγοι on him, which made him cry and reduced 
him to a feeling of inadequacy and shame, and implanted desires both to listen 
and to run away. The word ἐλέγχοντος is particularly appropriate for Socrates 
and suggests his question-and-answer method of teaching, which often resulted 
in the ignorance of his interlocutor being exposed, as it does to Alcibiades in the 
Platonic First Alcibiades12. The wrestling metaphor implied in πιεζοῦντος (cf. 
2.2) is also particularly appropriate; it brings to mind the wrestling of Socrates 
and Alcibiades in the Symposium, which Alcibiades hoped would lead to his 
seduction; instead of sex he gets a psychological going-over at Socrates’ hands13.
Despite this rough treatment, Plutarch goes on, “Alcibiades thought that 
Socrates’ business (πρᾶγμα) was in reality a service of the gods directed towards 
the care and salvation of the young” (4.4). The phrasing brings to mind, and 
implicitly refutes, the charges on which Socrates was tried and condemned, 
that he corrupted the young and denied the existence of the gods14; it also 
recalls Socrates’ own claim in the Apology, “I think that there has never been 
a greater good in the city than my own service to the god” (Ap. 30a). But 
the word πρᾶγμα alludes to the lead-up to the failed seduction scene in the 
Symposium, where Alcibiades says that he invited Socrates to dinner to find 
out “what his business (πρᾶγμα) was” (Smp. 217c)15. In the rest of Alcibiades’ 
speech in the Symposium we have a picture of a man profoundly affected by 
Socrates, though it is not quite clear how deep this goes; Plutarch is here 
a little more clear and explicit. Alcibiades himself now recognises the divine 
nature of Socrates’ mission, and this not only shows the profound spiritual and 
intellectual effect that Socrates had on the young man, but also confirms, as 
Plutarch puts it, Alcibiades’ own “potential for virtue” (4.1, 4.2). 
weaker, poorer and more isolated, so he can master him more fully. Cf. esp. 239c-d: “We should 
now see how he who has been forced to pursue pleasure rather than good will care for the 
body of whomever he masters. He will plainly pursue someone soft (μαλθακόν) and weak, not 
brought up in the clear sunshine but under a mingled shade, accustomed not to manly toils and 
healthy sweat but a soft and unmanly way of living (ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης) . . . In war 
and in other important crises such a body makes the enemy take heart but makes friends and 
even lovers afraid.” Cf. Amat. 749f.-750a.
12 C. B. R. Pelling, 2005, p. 118.
13 T. E. Duff, 1999, pp. 217-8; C. B. R. Pelling, 2005, p. 118. The language of wrestling 
can also be used metaphorically for sex and that may add to the resonance here: e.g. Ar., Peace 
896-898; Eccl. 964-5; ps.-Luc., Golden Ass 7-11; AP 12.206, 222.
14 Plato, Ap. 23c-d; 24b-26b; 30b; 33c-34b. Cf. Xen., Mem. 1.1.1; 1.2.1, 8; Ap. 10.
15 It also recalls the question asked by the young Alcibiades in the Platonic First Alcibiades 
(104d) about why Socrates kept bothering him, “For I really do wonder what your business is” 
(ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα). For Socrates’ πρᾶγμα, cf. also cf. Ap. 20c; Crito 53c-d.
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That we are meant to be thinking here of the Symposium, and of the failed 
seduction scene, is confirmed by Plutarch’s description immediately afterwards 
of how Alcibiades “despised himself, but admired him, loved his friendliness 
but was ashamed in the face of his virtue” (καταφρονῶν δ’ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ,
θαυμάζων δ’ ἐκεῖνον, ἀγαπῶν δὲ τὴν φιλοφροσύνην, αἰσχυνόμενος δὲ τὴν 
ἀρετήν). This is based on the emotions that Alcibiades confesses to feeling 
in the Symposium after his failure (219d-e): he thought himself “insulted, and 
yet was amazed at this man’s nature, chastity and manliness” (ἡγούμενον μὲν
ἠτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν). 
But Plutarch has made explicit what is implicit in Alcibiades’ words in the 
Symposium, that is, his self-loathing, and has also drawn the notion of Alcibiades’ 
shame before Socrates from earlier in his speech (216a-b). Indeed, in the 
Symposium Alcibiades had described how Socrates “despised”, i.e. counted as 
unimportant, his beauty (216e; 219c). Here Alcibiades extends that to a more 
thorough-going self-despising.
The Symposium, as we have noticed,  leaves it unclear to what extent 
Alcibiades’ feelings went beyond passionate obsession, curiosity and mortification 
at having his beauty held at nought, though his speech in praise of Socrates does 
suggest that he had some appreciation for Socrates’ uniqueness and wisdom. 
Plutarch is much more definite in his assertion that Alcibiades really did love 
Socrates back, claiming (4.4) in a quotation from the Phaedrus (255d), that 
Alcibiades acquired “an image of love . . . in return for love”. Socrates’ love, then, 
was a true, moral and educative one, and Alcibiades, to his credit, returned that 
love16. “The result”, Plutarch continues, “was that everyone was amazed when 
they saw him dining with Socrates, and wrestling with him and camping with 
him (συνδειπνοῦντα καὶ συμπαλαίοντα καὶ συσκηνοῦντα), while to all his 
other lovers he was harsh and hard to get to grips with . . .” In the Symposium 
Alcibiades had talked of his wrestling and eating with Socrates as part of his 
strategy of seducing him (συνεγινόμην. . συνημερεύσας . . . συγγυμνάζεσθαι
. . . συνδειπνεῖν: 217b-d)17. Here Plutarch uses this shared life as evidence of 
Alcibiades’ love for Socrates, which causes the amazement of everyone else18. 
Plutarch thus transforms what in Alcibiades’ mouth had been a tale of sexual 
desire and failed seduction into evidence of a life lived together. 
Plutarch goes on to contrast Alcibiades’ love for Socrates, and his humility 
in his presence, with his arrogant behaviour to other lovers, citing two examples 
of such arrogant behaviour (4.4-5.5)19. One of the examples which Plutarch 
16 The Symposium makes clear Alcibiades’ love for Socrates (cf. 222c). But there it is a 
passionate, obsessive and shocking love, in which Alcibiades takes the role of the erastes, though 
much younger than Socrates. Here the suggestion is of a more calm and chaste love. Cf. C. B. 
R. Pelling, 2005, p. 119.
17 The notion that Socrates did not regard himself as above his pupils but lived alongside them 
seems to have been an important one: cf. An seni. 796d, συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις 
καὶ συναγοράζων.
18 Note the sequence: they were first awe-struck at Alcibiades’ beauty (4.1); now they are 
amazed that he hangs around with Socrates (4.4).
19 The thought is familiar from the First Alcibiades, where, as here, there is a contrast between 
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mentions, the incident of Alcibiades’ outrageous treatment of Anytus (4.5-6), 
may have been partly inspired by the description of Alcibiades’ entry in the 
Symposium. The setting is the same: a symposium, to which Alcibiades arrives late 
and drunk, “stands at the door” (ταῖς θύραις ἐπιστάς; cf. Smp. 212d, ἐπιστῆναι 
ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας), and interrupts proceedings by his outrageous behaviour (cf. 
esp. Smp. 212d-e)20. But whereas his entry in the Symposium was greeted with 
indulgence, the consequences here are much more serious: the other guests talk 
of Alcibiades’ hubris and arrogance (ὑβριστικῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως) – the first 
appearance of accusations which will later in the Life become more frequent; 
and Anytus, though he indulges Alcibiades now, will later (as the readers are 
presumably meant to know) be one of Socrates’ accusers. One can certainly 
see how Alcibiades’ behaviour here might have lent weight to accusations that 
Socrates corrupted the young men under his tutelage. And that the mention 
of Anytus might bring these associations to mind is suggested by the fact 
that, when Plutarch tells the same story in his Dialogue on love, direct allusion 
is made to Anytus’ later role as Socrates’ prosecutor (Amat. 762c-d)21. This 
anecdote, then, like the next one in which Alcibiades forces a lover to bid for 
an expensive tax-farming contract (5.1-5), shows, as Plutarch makes clear in 
ch. 6, that Socrates’ influence on Alcibiades was limited and did not affect 
a complete transformation; indeed, Alcibiades’ arrogant behaviour may have 
contributed to his teacher’s prosecution and death.
In 6.1 we return to Socrates’ love for Alcibiades. Here, as in 4.1-2, 
Alcibiades wavers between devotion to Socrates and the attractions of his other 
lovers, who offer him pleasure and play on his ambition. Plutarch is once again 
drawing heavily on the Republic and First Alcibiades, but the clearest allusion 
is to Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium on the effect which Socrates had 
on him (esp. 215d-216c). Despite his many rivals for Alcibiades’ affections, 
Plutarch begins, “Socrates’ love would sometimes master (ἐκράτει) him, when 
because of his good nature (δι’ εὐφυΐαν) Socrates’ words would touch him 
and twist his heart and force out tears” (ἁπτομένων τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ 
τὴν καρδίαν στρεφόντων καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεόντων). This is an adaptation of 
Alcibiades’ attitude to Socrates and to his “other lovers”: Alc. 1 103a-104c; cf. Plu., Alc. 4.1; 4.4; 
5.1; 6.1.
20 The theme of Alcibiades’ drunken processions was a familiar one in declamation, 
influenced ultimately, one assumes, by the Symposium, and by the accusations that he was 
involved in the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries (Th. 6.28, which 
mentions drinking). Libanius, Decl. 12.20 has him arrive drunk to see Timon (πρὸς ἑσπέραν 
ἐπέστη μεθύων Ἀλκιβιάδης), and going on a komos with “torches from the mysteries” (Decl. fr. 
50, title). Several speeches imagine him being prosecuted for hubris after going on a komos to 
where the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria are held (Apsines, RG 1.348.4-7 [= 242 6 Spengel 
and Hammer]; Syrian, Scholia ad Hermogenis librum Περὶ στάσεων 4.601.15-17 Walz). Cf. R. 
Kohl, 1915, pp. 35-6.
21 Cf. C. B. R. Pelling, 1996, p. xlviii; 2005, pp. 123-4; R. L. Hunter, 2004, pp. 103-4. As 
Pelling notes, the reminiscence of Ap. 30a (Socrates’ speech at his trial) in 4.4 ensures that the 
trial is in our minds. Both Socrates’ detractors and defenders claimed that Socrates was executed 
for the behaviour of his pupils, especially Alcibiades and Critias, as much as for anything he 
himself said or did (e.g. Xen., Mem. 1.2.12-48). 
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Alcibiades’ words at Smp. 215e, “For my heart leaps, and tears pour out under 
the influence of his words” (ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν 
λόγων τῶν τούτου)22, but Plutarch has added στρεφόντων (“twisting”), which 
gains particular force because of the wrestling metaphor which follows in 6.2 
(cf. also πιεζοῦντος in 4.3); it also looks back to the earlier story of Alcibiades’ 
wrestling in 2.2-3: though in real wrestling Alcibiades could beat his opponent 
through a trick, emotionally and intellectually Socrates outwrestled him23. 
Plutarch has also added from the Republic the notion of Alcibiades’ εὐφυΐα, 
prominent already in ch. 4 (cf. Smp. 218a, μὴ ἀφυοῦς). Here, as in ch. 4, it 
provides an explanation for why Socrates took such an interest in Alcibiades; 
it also explains why Socrates’ words had such an effect on Alcibiades: it was to 
his credit that he allowed Socrates to master him.
In ch. 4, when discussing the tough treatment Alcibiades received at 
Socrates’ hands, Plutarch had quoted a line of a lost play, probably by the 
tragedian Phrynichos, “a cock, he crouched down like a slave, lowering his 
wing”24. The image is of a defeated bird in a cock-fight, which seems to have 
been called a δοῦλος (4.4)25. Now Plutarch presses the metaphor of slavery 
further: “There were times”, he continues (6.1), “when Alcibiades surrendered 
himself to his flatterers too, who offered many pleasures, and he would slip 
away from Socrates and like a runaway slave (δραπετεύων) would be quite 
simply hunted down, only towards Socrates having the experience of shame 
and fear” (πρὸς μόνον ἐκεῖνον ἔχων τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι) (6.1). The 
notion of Alcibiades as a runaway slave draws on his speech in the Symposium, 
where he describes himself as “in a state of slavery” to Socrates (215e: ὡς 
ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένου), and as trying to avoid listening to him but 
to flee instead. When he is in Socrates’ presence, he admits his deficiencies 
and feels ashamed: “I experienced only with this man, what no-one would 
have thought me capable of – shame before anyone. Only before him am 
I ashamed”26. But when he leaves Socrates’ presence he is “defeated by the 
honour which comes from the multitude”. “So I run away from him and flee 
(δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω), and when I see him I am ashamed as I 
think of my former admissions” (216b-c)27. But whereas Plato left it vague 
22 Noted by D. A. Russell, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, 196). Plutarch also paraphrases this 
passage in Prof. in Virt. 84d, Quomodo adulat. 69f, and Cat. Ma. 7.1
23 Στρέφω can be used of inflicting pain in general (e.g. Plato, Rep. 330e), but also of twisting 
an adversary in wrestling: e.g. Pollux 3.155; M. B. Poliakoff, 1982, pp. 140-1. ἀπωλίσθανε in 
6.1 (“used to slip away”) may suggest slipping out of an opponent’s grip in wrestling. The word 
is frequent in Plutarch though otherwise always used literally, but cf. Epict. 3.25.1 (ἀνάλαβε 
κἀκεῖνα ὧν ἀπώλισθες).
24 Or, “he crouched down like a slave-cock . . .”: ἔπτηξ’ ἀλέκτωρ δοῦλος ὣς κλίνας πτερόν.
25 Cf. Ar., Birds 71-72, ὄρνις ἔγωγε δοῦλος, with N. Dunbar, 1995, p. 158. Its application 
to the young Alcibiades suggests both his strutting and preening (cf. 1.8; 16.1) and the totality 
of his humiliation at Socrates’ hands. For cocks seen as symbolising strutting confidence, cf. 
Dem. 54.9.
26 πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ 
αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι.
27 D. A. Russell, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, p. 196) notes the parallels with 216b.
44
Timothy E. Duff
where Alcibiades runs off to (though the mention of the honour which comes 
from the multitude is suggestive), Plutarch is specific: to his other lovers, “who 
suggest many pleasures” (6.1).
But was pleasure all they offered? Plutarch has already hinted that it 
was not merely pleasure when he calls them “flatterers” (κόλαξι). He now 
explores this, and the contrast with what Socrates offers, further. First he 
quotes a saying of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, that he used words to 
attract his beloved, whereas his rivals could use the physical pleasures of the 
body. As before, knowledge of Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium deepens 
the implications of this passage: Cleanthes, Plutarch says, claimed that 
“someone loved by him [i.e. Cleanthes] had to be mastered by the ears, but 
provided many holds to his rivals in love which were out of bounds to him 
. . .” (6.2). The image is once again of wrestling28. But Cleanthes’ saying also 
recalls Alcibiades’ words in Smp. 216a: if he were willing to “lend Socrates 
his ears” (παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα) he would not be able to resist his arguments, and 
would have to admit that “I neglect myself while attending to the affairs of the 
Athenians”. “Therefore”, Alcibiades said, “I withhold my ears (ἐπισχόμενος 
τὰ ὦτα) as from the Sirens and make off, in order not to grow old, sitting 
here beside him”. We have already heard of the attempts of Socrates’ rivals 
to prevent Alcibiades from listening to Socrates (4.2)29. Memory of the 
Symposium passage confirms that Alcibiades was not an altogether willing 
or cooperative beloved. It also suggests the emotional turmoil in which 
Alcibiades found himself: he is deeply affected by philosophical talk and 
deeply attracted to Socrates; he wants to listen but, like Odysseus before 
the Sirens, he knows how dangerous listening to Socrates is30. Furthermore, 
memory of the Symposium passage also makes clear that it was Alcibiades’ 
political ambitions which pulled him away from Socrates; thus although 
Plutarch has talked of the “pleasures” his other lovers offered (6.1), and the 
saying of Cleanthes was about the pleasures of the flesh providing rival 
attractions to the words of the philosopher, we know that the stronger pull 
was Alcibiades’ political ambition, which he feared Socrates would make him 
want to give up. Indeed Plutarch now makes this point explicitly: “Alcibiades 
was of course susceptible to pleasures too” (ἦν μὲν ἀμέλει καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς 
ἀγώγιμος); however (οὐ μὴν ἀλλά) it was rather through taking hold of his 
love of honour and glory that those who were trying to corrupt him began 
28 An anecdote about Zeno uses the same metaphor: “the right hold to use on a philosopher 
is by the ears (ἐκ τῶν ὤτων). So persuade me and drag me off by them” (Diog. Laert. 7.24 = 
SVF 1.278). There is perhaps here a punning reference to a type of kiss, associated particularly 
with parents and children, which involved holding by the ears: De aud. 38c; Pollux 10.100; Tib. 
2.5.92; Aristaenetus, Ep. 1.24; Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.1.13.1.
29. . . ἀποκλειόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸς χάριν ἐξομιλούντων εἰσακοῦσαι τοῦ νουθετοῦντος καὶ 
παιδεύοντος, which alludes to Rep. 494d and 559d-560a.
30 Plutarch himself hints that Alcibiades might be seen as Odysseus by applying the 
word πολύτροπος to his fortunes (2.1) and his cleverness (24.5). Like Odysseus Alcibiades 
will wander in exile and desire to return home (cf. 32.1). Coriolanus was compared directly to 
Odysseus (Cor. 22.4). Cf. D. Gribble, 1999, pp. 26-7; 269-70.
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thrusting him prematurely into grandiose thinking, convincing him that, as 
soon as he entered upon public life . . .” (6.3)31.
The result of such flattery was that Alcibiades was made conceited, and 
Socrates was forced to do some tough-talking and to humble and crush him 
(6.5). As we have already noted, the metaphor which Plutarch uses here, of iron 
which has been softened in the fire and is then condensed and hardened in cold 
water, suggests very well both the painfulness of Socrates’ shock-treatment of 
Alcibiades, but also that his love had the effect of toughening Alcibiades and 
making a man of him (cf. 4.3). Socrates, Plutarch continues, made Alcibiades 
understand “how much he lacked and how incomplete he was in virtue” 
(ἡλίκων ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ ἀτελὴς πρὸς ἀρετήν). The reference to Alcibiades’ 
incompleteness in virtue recalls 4.1 where Socrates had recognised Alcibiades’ 
“potential for virtue” (εὐφυΐα πρὸς ἀρετήν). The return to this notion here not 
only provides a sense of closure to the section before we move on to a cluster 
of anecdotes, but also expresses neatly the Socratic method; the first and most 
important step for the gifted pupil was for him to acknowledge how truly 
ignorant he really was32. The wording also recalls Alcibiades’ speech in the 
Symposium, where he had declared, “He forces me to admit that, although I am 
sorely in need (πολλοῦ ἐνδεής33), yet I neglect myself . . .” (216a)34.
Several anecdotes follow, which seem to show Alcibiades’ desire for 
learning, but also his arrogance and ambition (7.1-3). We then hear two stories 
about Socrates and Alcibiades at Potidaea and Delium, the source for which is 
once again Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium (7.3-6 ~ 220d-221c). The two 
campaigns were actually separated by some eight years, and Delium (424 BC) 
postdates Alcibiades’ marriage, which is discussed in the next chapter (ch. 8)35. 
But in the Symposium Alcibiades talks about Delium directly after Potidaea, and 
Plutarch follows that order. He has, however, made some significant changes36. 
31 Plutarch cites in evidence Thucydides’ famous words about the “παρανομία of Alcibiades’ 
lifestyle as regards his body” (6.3 ~ Th. 6.15.4). For Plutarch’s use of this quotation, see C. B. R. 
Pelling, 1992, pp. 18-9; 1996, pp. xlix-li.
32 Contrast Coriolanus at Cor. 18.2-3, 21.1, who refuses to be humble when some humility 
would help. 
33 ἐνδεής can also mean “inferior” (LSJ b.3): the flatterers persuade Alcibiades that he will 
“put in the shade” other generals and orators, and “surpass” even Pericles (6.4) but Socrates 
shatters his illusions.
34 It also recalls the start of the First Alcibiades, where Socrates tells a younger Alcibiades 
“you say that you are not in need of anyone for anything” (οὐδενὸς φῂς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι 
εἰς οὐδέν; 104a). Both parallels are noted by D. A. Russell, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, p. 196). 
There is also allusion to Rep. 491d: if a plant lacks the proper food and environment, the stronger 
it is the more it falls short of perfection (ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων); so with talented men deprived 
of philosophical education. Cf. Cor. 1.3, alluding to the Rep. passage: a good nature which is 
lacking in education (παιδείας ἐνδεής) is unstable.
35 The battle associated with the Potidaea campaign is probably the one fought in 432 before 
the siege of Potidaea began, in which the Athenians lost their general and 150 hoplites, not 
counting allies (Th. 1.62-63). See K. J. Dover, 1980, p. 165.
36 He has also introduced some parallels with the Coriolanus. The mention that Socrates 
and A. “distinguished themselves” (ἠρίστευσαν) and the discussion of the prize (ἀριστεῖον) 
recall the description of the young and ambitious Coriolanus, who is said to have “joined 
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He describes Socrates as Alcibiades’ tent-mate and comrade in the battle-line 
(σύσκηνον...καὶ παραστάτην) (7.3; cf. 4.4, συσκηνοῦντα). This is Plutarch’s 
embellishment; in Symp 219e Alcibiades says merely that they ate together; 
indeed, they were from different tribes, so may have had to camp separately 
and were almost certainly brigaded in different hoplite units37. But having 
them fight together perhaps draws on another part of the Symposium, before 
Alcibiades’ entry: Phaedrus’ speech in Smp. 178e-179b. There, in arguing for 
the blessings that pederastic love brings, Phaedrus imagines pairs of erastai and 
paidika fighting side by side, defending each other on the battlefield. Plutarch 
thus assimilates Alcibiades and Socrates to this kind of idealised pederastic 
couple38. 
Plutarch’s description of Socrates’ saving Alcibiades at Potidaea, and of 
the award of the prize for valour to Alcibiades (7.4-5), is close to Alcibiades’ 
words in the Symposium (220d-221c)39. But Plutarch’s version is more vivid, 
as he creates a picture of Socrates standing guard (προέστη καὶ ἤμυνε) over 
a fallen Alcibiades. Furthermore, the term ἤμυνε recalls 4.1, where Socrates 
wanted to protect Alcibiades and not allow him to be corrupted (ἀμύνειν καὶ 
μὴ περιορᾶν . . .). Here Socrates’ protective role, exercised in the physical rather 
than spiritual dimension, is made concrete40. Plutarch’s version of the award 
of the prize is also more vivid and dramatic than the Platonic original41; the 
exploits to exploits (ἀριστείαις ἀριστείας) and added spoils to spoils” (4.3). The eagerness of A.’s 
commanders to give him the crown and suit of armour and Socrates’ testimony on his behalf 
recalls Coriolanus’ commanders, who were “always striving with their predessors to honour 
him and to surpass in their testimonials (marturiva”)”. “From none of the numerous conflicts 
in which Rome was involved did Coriolanus return uncrowned or without a prize”. Alcibiades, 
then, under Socrates’ influence, is as brave on the battlefield and as decorated as the soldierly 
Coriolanus. For other parallels, see nn. 32, 34, 40 and 46.
37 Cf. P. Krentz, 2007, p. 164.
38 Plutarch is here of course making more explicit what was implicit already in Plato: 
Alcibiades’ description of Socrates saving him in Smp. 220d-e would itself have brought 
Phaedrus’ speech to mind. The notion of pairs of lovers fighting side by side became reality 
in the early fourth century (i.e. around the time when Plato was writing the Symposium) in 
Thebes’ so-called Sacred Band; Xen., Smp. 8.32 mentions the Sacred Band in his discussion 
of pederasty; Plutarch in his discussion of the Sacred Band in Pel. 18-19 refers to Phaedrus’ 
speech (Smp. 179a), as well as to the Phaedrus itself (255b) (18.6); in Pel. 17.13 he quotes from 
Phaedrus’ speech (Symp. 178d): after Leuctra the other Greeks realised that it was not Sparta 
which produced good fighters, but wherever young men αἰσχύνεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ τολμᾶν 
ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς. Cf. Amat. 761b. 
39 In particular, Plutarch’s τοῦ δ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου τραύματι περιπεσόντος ὁ Σωκράτης προέστη 
καὶ ἤμυνε, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ προδήλως ἔσωσεν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων is closely based on Smp. 
220d-e: οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ.
40 Contrast Coriolanus’ lonely death without any one to protect him: προσήμυνεν οὐδεὶς 
τῶν παρόντων (Cor. 39.8). For other parallels between Alc. 7 and the Coriolanus, see T. E. Duff, 
1999, pp. 217-8.
41 Plu., Alc. 7.5: ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ στρατηγοὶ διὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο 
περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος αὔξεσθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ, 
πρῶτος ἐμαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει στεφανοῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν. Plato, Smp. 
220e: καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς ... 
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imperfects ἐμαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει draw the reader into the scene, as though 
we were watching it happen – a device typical of Plutarchan narrative42. The 
idea that the generals were influenced by Alcibiades’ “rank in society” (ἀξίωμα) 
is in Plato, but in Plutarch it gains extra point as it, like ἤμυνε, recalls 4.1, 
where Socrates’ desire to protect Alcibiades comes from his fear of the effect of 
Alcibiades’ “wealth and rank” (ἀξίωμα), and of those who, as Plutarch puts it, 
“rushed to lay hold of him with flatteries and favours”43. Thus for Plutarch the 
generals’ desire to curry favour with Alcibiades becomes part of this process 
of flattery. 
Plutarch has introduced two other changes44. First, he omits Alcibiades’ 
claim that he himself had urged the generals to award Socrates the crown. This 
may be because Plutarch simply judged Alcibiades’ claim unreliable (he would 
say that, wouldn’t he?). At any rate, in Plutarch’s telling, the sequence and its 
implications are simpler: Socrates deserved the prize but urged the generals 
to give it to Alcibiades; Socrates is the protector, educator and champion, 
Alcibiades the recipient of Socrates’ kindness (cf. 1.3) and protection45. Secondly 
Plutarch inserts a motive for Socrates’ championing of Alcibiades’ cause: he 
“wanted his [Alcibiades’] ambition in fine things (τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς 
αὐτοῦ) to increase”. That is, he wanted to direct in a worthy direction the 
ambition which has been such a feature of the early chapters of the Life (esp. 
2.1) and which his flatterers played on (6.4)46. The phrase thus presupposes 
that Alcibiades’ ambition might well be aimed at an unworthy goal, and 
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι 
τἀριστεῖα, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν.
42 E.g. Alc. 5.5; 14.12; 20.1; 25.2; 32.3; Pyrrh. 28.1-3, 5-7; 29.5-6. Smyth §1898 labels this 
the “imperfect of description’: “The imperfect often has a dramatic or panoramic force; it enables 
the reader to follow the course of events as they occurred, as if he were a spectator of the scene 
depicted”. On Plutarch’s tendency to use imperfects in narrative, see T. E. Duff, forthcoming.
43 φοβούμενος δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸν προκαταλαμβάνοντα κολακείαις καὶ 
χάρισιν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ συμμάχων ὄχλον (4.2), itself an allusion to Rep. 494c, προκαταλαμ- 
βάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Alcibiades’ αξίωμα (“rank in 
society”: LSJ 3), was owed in large part to his noble birth (Th. 5.43.2, ἀξιώματι προγόνων 
τιμώμενος; 6.15.3). Later in Plutarch’s Life his noble birth and wealth will “open great doors” 
(μεγάλας κλισιάδας) to his political career (10.3.)
44 He has also specified that the award consisted of a crown and suit of armour, a detail 
which he probably took from Isoc. 16.29. Crowns were regularly awarded for valour (e.g. Hdt. 
8.124; Aesch. 2.169; Plato, Rep. 468b: W. K. Pritchett, 1974, ii, pp. 276-90); it is not clear 
whether at this period they might be of gold or of e.g. laurel. There is no other evidence for the 
award of armour, though the use of the article suggests that Plutarch might have thought it well 
known: ibidem, pp. 289-90.
45 Cf. C. B. R. Pelling, 2005, pp. 122-3 n. 41: keeping attention focused on Socrates’ action 
rather than Alcibiades fits the larger theme of the struggle of Socrates and the flatterers for 
influence over Alcibiades.
46 This seems to find a parallel in the discussion of the effect of honour gained in war 
upon the young Coriolanus in Cor. 4.1-4 (see above, n. 36). Honour gained too early in life, 
Plutarch argues, may extinguish the desire for honour in “lightly ambitious souls”. But in the 
case of “weighty and firm spirits” (i.e. like Coriolanus) the honours impel them to “the apparent 
good” (πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν). The contrast between “the apparent good” and Alcibiades’ 
“ambition ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς” is suggestive. 
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shows Socrates combating the malign influence of Alcibiades’ flatterers. It also 
shows Socrates not only playing a pedagogical role but playing this role in the 
practical context of the battlefield; his love was not enervating or corrupting, 
as was theirs (cf. 4.3), nor was his instruction merely theoretical47.
But the phrase “ambition in fine things” also alludes specifically to Phaedrus’ 
speech in the Symposium (178c-179b). Phaedrus speaks of love bringing the 
greatest blessing a man can have. What love brings, Phaedrus claims, cannot 
be obtained by “kinship, honours or wealth” (all advantages that Alcibiades 
had)48; it provides a moral principle for life, that is, feeling “shame at shameful 
things, and ambition for fine things” (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, 
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν) (178d); thus, Phaedrus argues, lovers defend 
and never desert each other on the battlefield. By alluding to this passage, 
Plutarch makes more explicit what is implicit in Alcibiades’ description of the 
Potidaea campaign in the Symposium, namely, that Socrates and Alcibiades on 
campaign are to be seen as an ideal pederastic couple, with the older exercising 
an educational and protective role over the younger, and inspiring him towards 
fine conduct49.
The success of Socrates’ tutelage is revealed in the next incident, the 
story of how Alcibiades, in the aftermath of the Athenian defeat at Delium, 
despite being on horseback, refused to leave Socrates and make his own 
escape (7.6). This is closely based on Smp. 220e-221a, though Plutarch focuses 
attention more squarely on Alcibiades’ actions in defending Socrates rather 
than on Socrates’ calmness under attack. But this incident gains extra point 
in Plutarch from its placing immediately after Socrates’ attempt to nurture 
Alcibiades’ “ambition in fine things” (τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ); in 
Plutarch’s account Alcibiades’ defence of his teacher seems to show Socrates’ 
success in stirring Alcibiades to noble action, and thus confirms Alcibiades’ 
good nature and that he really did love Socrates50. Phaedrus in the Symposium 
imagined that no lover would desert his beloved, and at Potidaea Socrates 
had defended Alcibiades. Now Alcibiades, the beloved, defends Socrates, 
suggesting a mutuality in their love, a mutuality which Plutarch himself had 
emphasised in ch. 4, with a quotation from the Phaedrus itself (Alcibiades 
acquired “an image of love . . . in return for love”). Indeed Plutarch’s 
παρέπεμψε καὶ περιήμυνεν (“escorted and protected him”)51 recalls Socrates’ 
47 Cf. D. A. Russell, 1966, p. 41 (= repr. 1995, p. 197); C. B. R. Pelling, 1996, p. xlvii; D. 
Gribble, 1999, pp. 273-6. 
48 See 4.1-2; 10.3; Plato, Rep. 494c; Alc. 1.104a-b. Cf. Lys. 14, 18, 38; Dem. 21.143; Diod. 
12.84.1.
49 Plutarch is possibly influenced by Lys. 14.42, where Alcibiades’ son accuses his opponents 
of ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι.
50 Antisthenes had Socrates deserving a prize for bravery here too but giving it to Alcibiades 
(Antisthenes fr. V A 200 Giannantoni=FGrH 1004 F 4).
51 But περιήμυνεν, the reading of Υ, is doubtful; περιαμύνω is attested only here in Greek 
literature. Ziegler’s apparatus suggests προσήμυνεν (“came to the aid of ”), which may be right 
(cf. Fab. 16.5, ἀπολιπὼν τὸν ἵππον πεζὸς τῷ ὑπάτῳ προσήμυνε, and Holden on Them. 9.3). N.’s 
περιέμεινεν (“waited for”) seems bland, but may also be right.
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protection both moral (4.1: ἀμύνειν) and physical (7.4: προέστη καὶ ἤμυνε). 
Here Alcibiades is able to return Socrates’ protection52.
To conclude, my point in this paper has been a simple one. That is, that 
the Alcibiades draws heavily on Plato’s Symposium, and that knowledge of the 
Symposium enriches the experience of reading the Alcibiades; the chapters that 
we have examined (4-7), in which Plutarch frequently uses phraseology drawn 
from the Symposium, and frequently makes explicit what had been implicit 
there, become more meaningful when approached with the Symposium in 
mind. This is different from saying merely that the Symposium was used as 
a “source” for the Alcibiades; rather these chapters of the Alcibiades invite an 
intertextual reading with the Symposium, and for their full effect presuppose 
a reader who is familiar with it53. This has important implications for the way 
we might approach Plutarch’s use of other texts and other authors, both in the 
Alcibiades and elsewhere, where we might look not for a one-sided exploitation 
of source texts but for a creative dialogue with them.
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